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BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 18311 
A petition for writ of review was filed by the plaintiffs 
Ogden Standard Examiner and the State Insurance Fund to review 
an order of the Industrial Commission holding them liable for 
compensation benefits to the dependents of Clifford P. Cheney. 
DISPOSITION BY THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
A hearing was held June 5, 1981 before Administrative Law 
Judge Joseph Foley on the application of the conservators of the 
minor children of Clifford Cheney for workmen's compensation 
benefits. The employer of the deceased and its insurance car-
rier denied liability for his death on the ground that it did 
not arise out of or in the course of his employment. On 
November 25, 1981 the Administrative Law Judge entered his find-
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ings of fact, conclusions of law and order holding the plain-
tiffs liable to the dependents of the deceased for compensation 
benefits. A timely motion for review was filed by the plain-
tiffs pursuant to Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 35-1-82.53, as 
amended. On February 19, 1982 the Industrial Commission, through 
two of its members, entered an order denying the plaintiffs' 
motion for review and adopting the findings and conclusions of 
the Administrative Law Judge. The third member of the Commis-
sion filed a dissenting opinion expressing his conclusion that 
Mr. Cheney's death did not arise out of or in the course of his 
employment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs respectfully request that the court reverse the 
order of the Industrial Commission holding them liable for work-
men's compensation benefits as a result of the death of Clifford 
Cheney. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the time of his death on Saturday March 22, 1980, 
Clifford Cheney was the Managing Editor of the Ogden Standard 
Examiner. He had served in that capacity for nine months. (R 180) 
As managing editor, it was his responsibility to supervise 
those in the editorial department in the preparation of the news 
and editorial content of the newspaper. He had never personally 
covered any news event for the paper or written a story on a 
news event himself. He had no public relations duties, and other 
employees were assigned that function. (R 278-279, 284) 
Mr. Cheney died in an automobile accident which occurred in 
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the early morning hours on Highway 89 near Layton, Utah, as 
he was returning to his home in Ogden from Salt Lake City. 
Mr. Cheney was driving his own car when he apparently lost con-
trol on the slick road and was struck by an oncoming truck. 
His wife, the only passenger in the car, was also killed. {R 3-5) 
Mr. and Mrs. Cheney had spent Friday evening in the company 
of Mrs. Wilda Gene Hatch, president of the Standard Corporation 
(which does business as the Ogden Standard Examiner) , her hus-
band George Hatch, their son Randall Hatch and his wife. They 
had attended the annual Governor's Ball together and socialized 
at the home of the Hatches before and after the event. 
Mr. George Hatch testified at the hearing in this matter 
that prior to the evening in question he acquired two tickets 
to the Governor's Ball by virtue of his membership in the "Century 
Club," an organization of contributors to the Democratic Party. 
Upon learning that several other members of the Century Club 
who worked in companies affiliated with the Standard Corporation 
had also acquired tickets, he reserved a table at the event for 
himself and Mrs. Hatch and six others. (R 259) Each ticket holder 
purchased his own membership in the club, and none were purchased 
by the Hatches or by the Standard Corporation. (R 259) 
Later, several of those for whom Mr. Hatch had reserved 
seats decided not to attend, and they made their tickets available 
to him. (R 259,265) He discussed with his wife who they thought 
might enjoy attending the ball. It appeared originally that 
only one pair of tickets was available, and the Hatches invited 
their son and daughter-in-law to use them. When it developed that 
-3-
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they would be given others, they decided to invite the Cheneys. 
(R 240-241) 
Mrs. Hatch testified that on Monday or Tuesday of the week 
of the ball she met Mr. Cheney in the hall at the office of the 
Standard Examiner. She asked him if he had ever attended the 
Governor's Ball. He said that "he had always wanted to go." 
(241) She told him that she might have some extra tickets and 
would let him know later. (R 241) On Wednesday afternoon Mrs. 
Hatch told Mr. Cheney that she would, in fact, have extra tickets, 
that her son and daughter-in-law were attending, and asked whether 
he would like to attend. He told her that he would discuss it 
with his wife and would let her know. (R 242) 
The following day, either by phone or at the newspaper of-
fice, Mr. Cheney accepted Mrs. Hatch's invitation. He stated that 
he would drive down to Salt Lake from Ogden rather than ride with 
Randall Hatch, and Mrs. Hatch invited him to come to their home 
before the ball. She testified that she invited them because 
she thought the Cheneys might enjoy a social evening with them. 
(R 242-243) 
Mr. and Mrs. Cheney arrived at the home of the Hatches at 
approximately 6:15 Friday evening, and spent an hour there before 
leaving for the Salt Palace. Cocktails were served and Mr. and 
Mrs. Hatch, their son and daughter-in-law, and the Cheneys talked 
about their families, about traveling and camping in Utah, and 
about how the Cheneys liked living in Ogden. They admired the 
Hatch's collection of Indian artifacts and travel mementos and 
toured the house. There was no discussion about newspaper busi-
-4-
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ness. (R 243-244, 261, 274) 
At approximately 7:15 p.m. the group drove together in Mr. 
George Hatch's car to the Salt Palace. They sat at the table 
which had been reserved and spent the evening discussing the 
upcoming election campaign, as well as other topics about which 
they had been conversing previously, and meeting elected offi-
cials and others who came by their table. Mr. and Mrs. Cheney 
danced one dance, and the group left by 11:30 p.rn. There was 
no discussion of the business of the Standard Examiner. 
The city editor of the newspaper assigned a reporter, Flora 
Ogan, to cover the event as its press representative. She at-
tended the ball and wrote the story about it which appeared the 
following day. (R 290-291) 
The Cheneys returned to the Hatch's home after leaving the 
Salt Palace. Mr. Hatch served Mr. Cheney another drink and they 
talked about the ball. Randall Hatch discussed with his wife 
whether she wanted to spend the night in Salt Lake, and the 
Cheneys offered to give Randall a ride home. Randall and his 
wife decided to return to Ogden in their car, however, and the 
Cheneys left Mrs. Hatch's home at about 12:30 a.m. Business was 
not conducted or discussed. (R 246-247, 261-263, 276) 
Testimony was presented at the hearing in this matter con-
cerning the nature and purpose of the Governor's Ball, which is 
held annually to raise money for the Governor's political party. 
(R 6-25) Mr. Cheney's brother-in-law and sister-in-law and two 
co-workers also testified concerning statements he made to them 
about his intention to discuss business during his evening with 
-5-
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Mr. and Mrs. Hatch. 
POINT 1 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S FINDINGS OF 
FACT DO NOT SUPPORT ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION 
THAT CLIFFORD CHENEY'S DEATH AROSE OUT 
OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
This Court has held many times that in reviewing an order 
of the Industrial Commission it will examine the findings of 
fact made by the Commission in light of the issue of law raised 
by a claim for benefits to·determine whether an award is support-
ed by those findings, Jones v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 
121, 61 P.2d 10 (1936), and further, that it will review the 
evidence insofar as necessary to determine whether there is sub-
stantial, competent evidence upon which to support an award. 
Tintic Standard Mining Co. v. Industrial Commission, 100 Utah 
96, 110 P.2d 367 (1941); Savage v. Industrial Commission, 565 
P.2d 782 (Utah 1977). The plaintiffs respectfully submit that 
the findings of fact made by the Commission do not support its 
conclusion that Clifford Cheney's death arose out of or in the 
course of his employment within the meaning of the Utah Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 35-1-45 provides that the depen-
dents of an employee "who is killed by accident arising out of 
or in the course of his employment" are entitled to workmens' 
compensation benefits. Construing Section 45 of the Compensation 
Act, this Court has held that an accident arises out of or in the 
course of employment if it occurs while an employee is performing 
his assigned duties, or is doing " ... things which it should 
-6-
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reasonably be expected an employee would do in connection with 
those duties." United States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d 
508, 509 (Utah 1980). In the case of Askren v. Industrial Com-
mission, 15 Utah 2d 275, 391 P.2d 302, 304 the court stated that 
[t]he essential thing is that there be 
some substantial relationship between 
the activity engaged in and the carry-
ing on of the employer's business. 
More precisely, this court has held that the phrase "aris-
ing out of" as used in Section 45 refers to the origin or cause 
of an injury, and that the phrase "in the course of" refers to 
the time, place and circumstances of an injury. Utah Apex Min-
ing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 67 Utah 537, 248 P.2d 490 (1926). 
The court stated that, 
An injury which occurs in the cours~ 
of the employment will ordinarily, but 
not necessarily, arise out of it, while 
an injury arising out of an employment 
almost necessarily occurs in the course 
of it. 
248 P.2d at 413. 
In the case of an employee whose place and hours of work 
are fixed, it is usually not difficult to ascertain whether an 
accident arises out of or in the course of his employment. When 
an injury occurs to an employee whose place and time of work are 
flexible, more difficult questions may be presented, just as the 
issue may be closer when an employee who is injured outside the 
ordinary place or hours of employment claims that some special 
nexus between his employment and the after hours, off premises 
injury brings it within the scope of the Compensation Act. 
-7-
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Professor Arthur Larson, (hereinafter referred to as 
"Larson"), in his treatise, Workmen's Compensation Law, ex-
amines a variety of circumstances where injuries to workers 
may present difficult questions of compensability, including 
injuries which arise out of an employee's attendance at a social 
event. Summarizing the law of American jurisdictions generally, 
Larson states that 
Recreational or social activities are 
within the course of employment when 
(1) They occur on the premises during 
a lunch or recreation period as a regular 
incident of the employment; or 
(2) The employer, by expressly or im-
pliedly requiring participation, or by 
making the activity part of the services 
of an employee, brings the activity with-
in the orbit of the employment; or 
(3) The employer derives substantial 
direct benefit from the activity beyond 
the intangible value of improvement in 
employee health and morale that is com-
mon to all kinds of recreation and social 
life. 
Larson, supra, Vol. lA, Sec. 22 p. 5-71. 
The case at bar does not concern an accident on an employ-
er's premises, and Larson's analysis is useful in this instance 
in its second an~ third facets. With reference to the second 
basis for bringing a social activity within the course of a 
worker's employment Larson states that, 
The distinctive feature of this test is 
that it turns on what the employer him-
self does. 
Lqrson, supra, Vol. lA, Sec. 22.2 at p. 5-78. 
Larson examines a range of conduct on the part of an employer 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which might bring social or recreational activity within the 
course of employment by him. If an employer makes attendance 
at social affairs a part of an employee's job description, or 
if an employer actually requires an employee's attendance at a 
given event, its relation to the course of his employment is 
clear. When the employer's involvement with the social event 
is less, the question is closer, however. 
When the degree of employer involvement 
descends from compulsion to mere sponsor-
ship or encouragement, the questions be-
come closer, and it becomes necessary to 
consult a series of tests bearing on work-
connection. The most prolific illustra-
tions of this problem are company picnics 
and office parties. Among the questions 
to be asked are: Did the employer in fact 
sponsor the event? To what extent was at-
tendance really voluntary? Was there some 
degree of encouragement to attend in such 
factors as taking a record of attendance, 
paying for the time spent, requiring the 
employee to work if he did not attend, or 
maintaining a known custom of attending? 
Did the employer finance the occasion to 
a substantial extent? Did the employees 
regard it as an employment benefit to which 
they were entitled as of right? Did the 
employer benefit from the event, not merely 
in a vague way through better morale and 
good will, but through such tangible ad-
vantages as having an opportunity to make 
speeches and awards? 
lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.23, p. 5-85. 
When the degree of employee involvement in sponsoring or 
promoting an event is minimal, courts may, in Larson's view, pro-
perly inquire whether the employer derived sufficient direct 
benefit from an employee's attendance to make it effectively a 
service to his employer. As examples of such benefits,Larson 
cites cases where compensation was awarded because of the en-
-9-
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hancement of sales which a businessmen's entertainment of cus-
tamers is expected to produce, the advertising benefit which 
may result from a company softball team, or the opportunity of 
which an employer may avail himself at a social event to present 
awards or make speeches. lA Larson, supra, 22.30. 
Larson emphasizes, however, that less tangible benefits 
to an employer from an employee's social activities such as 
improved relations, better morale, or increased efficiency have 
been found insufficient to bring an activity within the coverage 
of compensation acts. The problem, Larson notes, 
is not that such benefits do not result, 
but that they result from every game the 
employee plays whether connected with his 
work or not. . . 
* * * 
And so, just as in the sleeping and eating 
cases some arbitrary time and space limi-
tations must circumscribe the area within 
which the "benefit" establishes work-con-
nection, the recreation cases must submit 
to some similar limitation, since other-
wise there is no stopping point which can 
be defined short of complete coverage of 
all employee's refreshing social and re-
creational activities. It can be taken 
as the majority view that these morale and 
efficiency benefits are not alone enough 
to bring recreation within the course of 
employment. 
lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.30 at Pp. 5-116-117. 
'Ibis Court has not had occasion to adopt expressly the 
Larson test of the compensability of accidents which arise out 
of participation in a social event. The Court has, however, 
relied on Professor Larson's analysis of other course of em-
ployment issues as with injuries arising out of horseplay, 
-10-
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e.g., Prows v. Industrial C"ommission, 610 P.2d 1362 (1980). 
Furthermore, a review of Utah decisions discloses a strict ad-
herence to the principle that the course of employment includes 
only those activities in which an employee is reasonably re-
quired to engage in the performance of ~is duties, and which 
directly and tangibly benefit his employer. 
In the case of Lundberg v. Cream O'Weber Dairy Farms, 24 
Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175 (197oi the Industrial Commission denied 
benefits to the widow of a sales manager who died in an automobile 
accident while driving home from a special sales meeting held 
before normal working hours. The court affirmed the denial, 
holding that the case fell within the rule that an employee is 
not acting in the course of his employment when he drives to or 
from work. 
It is true that the statute does not re-
quire that a compensable accident be at any 
particular place and that Workmen's Compen-
sation coverage has been approved in cer-
tain cases even though the employee had not 
arrived at the place of employment. 
* * * 
Notwithstanding what has be·en said in 
those cases, it is fundamental that even 
though the employee may not be at a regular 
place of work, he must be performing a duty 
for his employer, or one which is so con-
nected with his employment as to be an es-
sential part thereof, so that the mandate of 
the statute is met that there must be an 
"accident arising out of or in the course 
of employment." (emphasis supplied) 
465 P.2d at 176. 
It was noted that the general rule in Utah and in other 
jurisdictions is that injuries sustained while an employee is 
-11-
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going to or corning from work are not compensable. See also: 
Barney v. I'ndustrial Commission, 29 U.2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 
(1973); Roberts v. Industrial Commission, 87 Utah 10, 47 P.2d 
1052 (1935). Exceptions to the general rule have been allowed 
when an employer furnishes transportation to and from work, or 
when a route which is an employee's sole access to his place of 
work contains a hazard that is peculiar to that route, e.g. 
Cudahay Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 
Pac. 148 (1922). The applicant relied instead on another ex-
ception, contending that her husband was engaged in a "special 
mission" for his employer when he drove to the early morning 
sales meeting. Similarly, Professor Larson notes that when ac-
cidents which occur while driving to or from a social event are 
found to be compensable it is because the social event itself 
is found to be one which the usual test brings within the course 
of employment, so that the trip to attend it is a "special rnis-
sion. "lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.23 p. 5-100, note 70. 
This Court has analyzed "special mission" claims by the 
same criteria which apply to other course of employment 
issues. In the case of Wilson v. Industrial Commission, 116 Utah 
46, 207 P.2d 1116 (1949), the court reversed an award of benefits 
to dependents of an employee who was killed on a trip from his 
home in Salt Lake City to a shop in Magna to repair a car for his 
employer, a used car dealer and auto repairman. The applicants 
contended that the deceased had been sent specially to Magna to 
perform that task. The employer contended that he had not dir-
ected the deceased to make a special trip for that purpose but 
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had merely informed him that he would be required to make the 
repairs after he arrived at work. The court stated the basis 
of its holding as follows: 
The employer's instructions in this in-
stance merely directed the decedent as to 
what he should do after arriving at his 
place of employment. The instructions 
given did not send the deceased upon a 
special errand but merely outlined what 
would be expected of him in performing 
his duties the next day. 
207 P.2d at 1119. 
In Wilson, as in other cases construing the "special mis-
sion", or "special errand" rule, the test applied is whether 
or not the employee was instructed to make the trip which re-
sulted in his death, or whether the trip was one otherwise part 
-
of the employee's duties. 
The case of Board of Education v. Industrial Commission, 
102 Utah 504, 132 P. 2d 381 (1942), involved a physical education 
instructor employed by the Logan City Board of Education. The 
instructor was required as a condition of his employment to serve 
as a member of the Logan City Recreational Council which was a 
joint enterprise between the school ·district and the city. Be-
cause of his expertise on the subject, the instructor was asked 
to give an address about public recreation to the Lions Club in 
Brigham City. He was injured in an automobile accident returning 
to Logan. 
The Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission's award 
of benefits to the applicant on the ground that there was insuf-
ficient competent evidence that a speech such as he had made 
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in Brigham City was part of his required duties as an employee 
of the Board of Education. The Court found no evidence that his 
employer had required the applicant to make the speech or that 
the employer benefited from any service rendered there. 
The case of Auerbach Co. v. Industrial Commission, 113 Utah 
347, 195 P.2d 245 (1948), concerned an automobile accident which 
arose out of a recreational event. A department store cashier 
was injured while driving to a basketball game in which she was 
to play on a team sponsored by her employer. Despite the fact 
that gas for her travel was purchased by the company, and that 
the public relations officer for Auerbach's was in charge of the 
team, the Industrial Commission's award of benefits to her was 
reversed by the Supreme Court. The Court held that since the 
applicant was not hired and compensated to play sports for her 
employer, and since her participation on the company team was 
entirely voluntary, her accident did not arise out of her employ-
ment. The concurring Justices noted that although the employer 
obviously derived some advertising benefit from the team it did 
not render the injured worker's travel to the sporting event 
part of her employment. 
The case of Martinson v. W-M Insurance Agency, 606 P.2d 256 
(Utah 1980),arose from an injury sustained by an insurance execu-
tive in an automobile accident while returning to his home in 
Salt Lake City from a social function in Park City he claimed 
to have attended for business reasons. The applicant's company 
insured the Kimball Art Center and he drove to Park City to at-
tend its grand opening. He st~yed over night with the director 
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of the center who was a friend and former employer. 
Affirming the Industrial Commission's denial of benefits, 
the Supreme Court stated that 
To maintain actuarial soundness and in-
tegrity of workmen's compensation systems, 
it is essential that premiums be collected 
to cover the risks involved. The coverage 
does not, and as a practical matter, cannot 
extend to any injury done to an employee 
wherever and whenever it happens but is 
limited to accidental injuries which occur 
in the course of or arise out of the per-
formance of his duties. 
* * * 
Reverting to the issue in this case in 
the light of what has just been said: the 
problem presented to the Commission was 
whether the plaintiff was actually and 
basically involved in the performance of his 
duties, or was mainly involved in a social 
situation with his friend and former employ-
er, and then after he became involved in the 
accident, claims that he was engaged pri-
marily in a business situation. 
In justification of its _conclusion, the 
Commission noted certain significant facts: 
that except for his own testimony as to the 
desirability of doing so, there was no evi-
dence that the plaintiff was directed or re-
quired by his employer to go to Park City on 
the insurance business; and that under the 
facts shown, there is no reason to believe 
that anything that needed to be done about 
increased insurance could not have been 
done without anyone leaving the Salt Lake 
Office. Consequently, it recited that upon 
its consideration of the whole evidence, its 
conclusion was that the plaintiff's trip 
was primarily social and not within the 
course of his employment. (emphasis supplied) 
606 P.2d at 257-258. 
Again in the Martinson case, the absence of sufficient 
evidence that the injured employee was directed to attend an 
event or that any substantial business was conducted there re-
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sulted in a ruling that he had failed to sustain his burden of 
proving his injury was related to his employment. 
The plaintiffs respectfully submit that in order to affirm 
an award of compensation benefits for the death of an employee 
in an automobile accident while returning from a social event, 
this court must determine that the Industrial Commission has 
made findings supported by competent evidence that are suff i-
cient under the principles announced in prior Utah decisions to 
establish its cornpensability. At the very least, the Commission's 
findings must be consistent with Larson's analysis of claims 
arising out of social events; it must be found that the injured 
employee was expressly or impliedly required to attend the event 
or that his attendance there was of such a direct and substantial 
benefit to his employer that it could fairly be said to be within 
the scope of his services to his employer. 
Turning to the findings of fact made by the Industrial 
Commission through the initial order of the Administrative Law 
Judge and in the order denying the plaintiffs' motion for review, 
it is clear that they do not support the conclusion that Clifford 
Cheney's death arose out of or in the course of his employment. 
In his order awarding benefits the Administrative Law Judge 
lists as findings of fact in addition to those which were stip-
ulated by the parties, that is, the occurrrence of the accident 
and the dependency of the children of the deceased, the following: 
(1) the deceased was invited to attend the 
Governor's Ball by Mrs. Hatch; (R. 331) 
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(2) the deceased regarded his invitation as 
an opportunity to persuade Mrs. Hatch to 
publish a particular article and to discuss 
editorial policy; (R 332) 
(3) the deceased did not have an opportunity 
to have the discussion with Mrs. Hatch he 
intended; 
(4) the deceased was amply prepared to discuss 
work related matters had the opportunity pre-
sented itself. 
In denying the plaintiffs' motion for review the two member 
majority of the Industrial Commission cited the following find-
ings in support of their affirmance of the Administrative Law 
Judge's order~ 
(5) the deceased attended the function with a 
business purpose in mind; 
(6) the invitation to attend by the employer 
brought the activity within the scope of his 
employment; 
(7) the Ball was considered a business-linked 
event by many and the deceased attended the 
ball with the intent of acting as a represen-
tative of the Ogden Standard Examiner. 
It is immediately apparent when the Commission's findings 
of fact are compared with the requirements for compensability of 
an accident under Utah law that the findings do not support the 
award made. 
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The Commission found that the deceased was "invited" by 
the president of the corporation which employed him to attend 
the Governor's Ball. It did not find that he was required either 
directly or indirectly to attend. The Canmission found that no busi-
ness was discussed at the event but that the deceased attended 
with the intention of discussing business or otherwise "repre-
senting" his business. However, the Commission did not find 
that the employer of the deceased actually benefited by his at-
tendance through his performance of any business function, or 
through his presence in some capacity as a representative of the 
Standard Examiner. 
The Industrial Commission's conclusions of law in this case 
stand in marked contrast to the decisions of this court in claims 
arising out of accidents which occurred as an employee was re-
turning from an event away from the employer's premises. In each 
such case, this court has required a finding that the employee 
was actually engaging in a service to his employer at the time 
he was injured. 
By finding simply what was conceded by all that the deceased 
was "invited" to attend the Governor's Ball, the Commission has 
concluded in effect that he was not "compelled" to attend. By 
finding that no business was discussed during the evening of 
Mr. Cheney's death, that he intended to do so but did not have 
the opportunity, the Commission has effectively found that no 
busniess purpose was served by his attendance at the ball and 
visit to the Hatch's home. 
The only legal conclusion which can be drawn from the Corn-
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mission's own findings of fact is that the death of Clifford 
Cheney did not arise out of or in the course of his employment 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. (1953) Sec. 35-1-45 and 
the Commission's order should therefore be reversed. 
POINT II 
THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE 
DECEASED'S DEATH AROSE OUT OF HIS 
EMPLOYMENT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY SUB-
ST~..NTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Apart from a consideration of whether the Commission's 
findings of fact support its award, this court has jurisdiction 
on review to examine the record to determine whether there is 
substantial competent evidence to support the conclusion of 
the Industrial Commission that the accident in issue is compen-
sable. The plaintiffs submit that there is no evidence in the 
record upon which the Commission could have made findings which 
would support the award. 
Turning first to the question whether the deceased was 
expressly or impliedly required to visit Mrs. Hatch's home and 
attend the Governor's Ball, a test which focuses, as Larson noted, 
"on what the employer himself does,"lA Larson, supra, Sec. 22.2 
at p. 5-78, the evidence is not in conflict. 
Mrs. Hatch's testimony about her own conduct 1s, 1n its 
entirety, as follows: 
Q. Tell me how you came to invite Mr. Cheney, 
then. 
A. Well, I said, "Have you ever been to a 
Governor's Ball?" knowing that while he lived 
up in Logan, they hadn't been in Salt Lake that 
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much. And he said, "No, I've always wanted to 
go, but it was always too expensive." 
Q. Where did this conversation take place? 
A. Oh, I think in the hall, one of the hall-
ways to the Standard. 
Q. Do you remember what day of the ueek? 
A. I think it was Monday or Tuesday. 
Q. Monday or Tuesday of the week--
A. The week of the ball. 
Q. To your recollection the conversation was 
in the hallway? 
A. Uh huh. And so I said, "Well, I may have 
some extra tickets, but I'll have to let you 
know." And so that was the end of that conver-
sation. 
Q. When did you next converse with him about 
the invitation? 
A. It was about Wednesday. 
Q. What occurred? 
A. Wednesday afternoon. I said: "I will have 
some extra tickets, and if you would like to come 
down to the ball with your wife that would be fine. 
My son is coming, and you could drive down with 
them." 
Q. Where did you see Mr. Cheney on Wednesday? 
A. I think he came in to my office to ask me 
something about the editorial department. 
-20-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. Did he accept the invitation? 
A. He said he would talk to his wife and see 
what they had planned and let me know. 
Q. When did you next converse about the invita-
tion? 
A. I don't know whether he called or whether 
it was the next time I was up at the paper. He--
I really can't recall. He did indicate, whichever 
way it was, from a phone call or I ran into him 
at the paper, that they would like to come. And 
at that time I said: "Well, you know, it's not 
fancy. It's held in the Salt Palace, which is 
kind of barny, and they don't have a big fanfare 
like they used to. And so you don't have to wear 
a tux, and you wife can wear a short dress. It's 
not just a dressy affair any more." 
And so then I said, "How do you want to come?" 
And he said, "We'll drive our own car." 
And so I said, "That's fine." And I told him 
the time to come and to come by our house in Salt 
Lake ahead of the ball. 
Q. What was your purpose in inviting Mr. and Mrs. 
Cheney to take those extra tickets to the ball? 
A. I just thought that he might enjoy doing some-
thing social with us. I had been friends with Cliff 
for quite a long time. I knew him when he was up in 
Logan, not well, but I had seen him at various con-
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ferences and Sigma Delta Chi meetings. And I 
thought he would enjoy having a social evening, 
and especially since my son was coming down that 
they could get acquainted. And I had never met 
his wife. That occasion didn't often occur. 
(R 241-243) 
The relevant ipquiry in reviewing the evidence is whether 
it could support a finding that (a) Mrs. Hatch either expressly 
or impliedly compelled Mr. Cheney to accept her invitation or 
(b) whether by her conduct or that of other supervisors, Mr. 
Cheney's attendance at the social event was made part of the 
services he was expected to render to the newspaper. 
Courts have generally agreed with Professor Larson that 
compulsion to attend a social event may be indirect and subtle 
and yet still sufficiently forceful to make such an activity 
a requirement of employment. See, e.g., cases cited in an 
annotation at 47 ALR3d 566, "Workmen's Compensation: Injury 
Sustained While Attending Employer-Sponsored Social Affair." 
However, none of the factors which are generally relied on as 
evidence of indirect compulsion and were discussed earlier, are 
present in the case at bar. 
Considering these factors individually, the evidence is 
undisputed that (1) the Governor's Ball was not a social event 
sponsored by the Ogden Standard Examiner; (2) Mr. Cheney's at-
tendance was not specifically required; (3) there is no evidence 
of any known custom of managing editors of the newspaper attend-
ing the function; (4) tickets to the event were not purchased 
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or paid for by the employer; (5) no claim was made that atten-
dance at the ball was an employee benefit to which Mr. Cheney 
was entitled. 
The defendant may speculate as his counsel did in argument 
before the Commission that the disparity in age and in relative 
position at the newspaper made a social invitation from Mrs. 
Hatch to Mr. Cheney inherently compulsory. However, there is 
no evidence whatsoever from which the inference of compulsion 
to attend can be drawn. The tone of the interchange between 
Mrs. Hatch and Mr. Cheney, the fact that she asked him whether 
he would like to attend, that he stated he had always wanted to 
but had found it too expensive, and his response that he needed 
to check his plans with his wife, all suggest the voluntariness 
of the choice Mr. Cheney was given to attend. 
The record is devoid of evidence of any other conduct on 
the part of supervisory personnel which would make attendance at 
the ball a required service of his employment. 
It was the testimony of Mr. Cheney's immediate supervisor, 
Jay Banks, General Manager of the Standard_Examiner, that Mr. 
Cheney's position as managing editor included no duty to act 
as a public relations representative of the newspaper (R 284) 
and a reporter was assigned by the city editor to cover the 
event as a news story. (R 291) His successor, Mr. Randall Hatch, 
testified that public relations activities are entirely incon-
sistent with the detachment and impartiality required of one who 
manages the news and editorial department. The Industrial Com-
rnission' s finding that the deceased attended the Governor's Ball 
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"with the intent of advancing the interests of his employer by 
acting as a representative of the business at the event" (R 351) 
may or may not be a justifiable finding as to the state of mind 
of the deceased, but is not even remotely based upon any evi-
dence of conduct of the employer which would make his attendance 
at the ball an act in furtherance of public relations duties, or 
an act of representation of the newspaper in any capacity. 
As noted, even in the absence of conduct on the part of the 
employer which makes attendance at a social event a specific re-
quirement of his employment, it may still be found to arise out of 
a worker's employment according to Professor Larson if there is 
evidence that the employer derived substantial direct benefit to 
his business from the activity engaged in. The applicant in this 
case did not contend that any business was conducted or discussed 
during the evening Mr. Cheney spent in the company of the Hatches. 
Mr. and Mrs. Hatch and their son Randall Hatch each testified 
that the group conversed during the evening exclusively about 
matters unrelated to the newspaper. (R. 246-247, 261-263, 276) 
Although counsel for the applicant argued before the Com-
mission that Mr. Cheney's presence at the Governor's Ball may 
have benefited the public relations of the newspaper, no evidence 
to that effect was introduced. The applicant did present the 
testimony of a former Democratic Party official and a former 
aid to the Governor concerning the nature and purpose of the 
Governor's Ball. Both testified that it is held primarily to 
raise money for the Democratic Party. (R. 157, 169) Both were also 
asked to state their opinions about "why people attend the Gover-
nor's Ball." Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to this testi-
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mony on the ground that no foundation was laid for their expression 
of opinions about the motives of other people who attended the 
Governor's Ball and that such opinions bore no relevance to the 
decisions of the parties in this case. (R 159-161, 171) Mr. 
Briggs was permitted to testify, however, that some people at-
tended the ball as an expression of support for the Democratic 
Party (R 163), some people attended because of the entertainment 
and social aspects of the function, (R 162) and some people 
attended because of the "kind of interaction which took place 
there." (R 164) Mrs. Wilde testified that many people attend 
the ball to support the Democratic Party but that business and 
industrial leaders commonly attend because of a "subtle belief 
that it opens doors for them." (R 172) 
Even if it were proper to receive the evidence from these 
officials about why people attend the Governor's Ball, it pro-
vides no support for any finding about what benefit to its busi-
ness the Standard Examiner derived from Clifford Cheney's presence 
there. One could only speculate about the good will for the news-
paper that might have been generated by the attendance of anyone 
in the Hatch's group, but no evidence of such a benefit can be 
found in the record. 
The jist of the applicant's case, and the expressed basis 
for the Industrial Commission's award, was the evidence produced 
by the testimony of two co-workers of the deceased and of his 
brother-in-law and sister-in-law that Mr. Cheney's purpose in 
attending the ball was to discuss with Mrs. Hatch a series of 
articles he wanted published which she had apparently rejected, 
and to otherwise increase his influence over her in matters of 
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editorial policy. 
Plaintiffs objected to the introduction of extensive hear-
say evidence about statements made by the deceased concerning 
his motivation for accepting Mrs. Hatch's invitation, and the 
basis of this objection is the subject of later discussion. 
Assuming for the purpose of argument, however, that all the hear-
say testimony about Mr. Cheney's motives is competent evidence 
upon which to make a finding in this case, and assuming further 
that his primary purpose in attending the ball was to discuss 
business and heighten his influence in newspaper policy decisions, 
the plaintiffs submit that such evidence still fails to establish 
that Mr. Cheney's death arose out of or in the course of his em-
ployrnent. 
Though the Industrial Commission does not clearly articulate 
it, the legal view it expresses is that an accident which occurs 
when an employee is returning from an off-premises after-hours 
social event is compensable if the employee attended it with the 
intention of conducting or discussing business when he arrived, 
even if no business is actually conducted or discussed.l 
1 The Administrative Law Judge made the following remarks in his 
discussion of the evidence: 
No business was discussed by the parties 
at the ball. Being the guests of the Hatches, 
the tone of the conversation of the evening 
was more or less set by them notwithstanding 
the fact that Mr. Cheney was prepared to dis-
cuss the Freeman Institute article or other 
business related matters. He did not get the 
chance to do so, and as a guest of the Hatchs 
it appears he did not feel it in good taste 
to bring the matters up unless the opportunity 
was presented by Mr. or Mrs. Hatch. (R 332) 
This explanation for the fact that those gathered did not discuss 
business is completely speculative and without the sliahtest evi-
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The Industrial Commission's construction of Section 45 of 
the Compensation Act is directly contrary to the holdings of 
this court. In each of the Utah decisions discussed earlier, it 
will be noted that the Court's determination of whether or not 
an accident arose out of or in the course of employment was based 
on an objective standard. 
In the Auerbach and the Logan Board of Education cases, dis-
cussed earlier, the inquiry was the same; was this trip one which 
the applicant or deceased's employer specifically required him 
to make, was it otherwise part of the duties he was hired and 
assigned to perform, or was it of such benefit to the employer 
that it could fairly be said to be in fulfillment of a service 
to the employer. In neither of these cases nor in other Utah 
decisions on the subject was the motive or belief of the employee 
about the nature of the trip considered sufficient evidence in 
itself to bring such a trip within the course of his employment. 
The defendant argued before the Commission that because the 
deceased was a managerial employee with flexible working hours 
his intention to conduct business during a social evening, even 
if not carried out, made his trip to attend the ball a job assign-
ment. This court's opinion in Martinson, supra, belies such a 
view of the course of a managerial employee's employment. In 
considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Com-
mission's finding that the applicant's trip to Park City had 
been a social one and not in furtherance of his business, the 
court defined the Commission's task to be a determination of 
whether the employee "was actually and basically 'involved in 
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the performance of his duties or was mainly involved in a 
social situation •.. " Martirtson, supra, 606 P.2d at 257. 
The necessary evidence which this court said was lacking for a 
finding of compensability was evidence that the applicant had 
been "directed or required to go to Park City on insurance busi-
ness" or had actually conducted business. Martinson, supra, 606 
P.2d at 258. 
The subjective intent of a white collar, managerial employ-
ee in attending a social event is not more dispositive of the 
issue of cornpensability than are the motives of other workers in 
attending such events. Mr. Cheney was not self-employed; he was 
subject to the direction and control of his immediate supervisor, 
Mr. Banks, and ultimately of the Standard Corporation of which 
Mrs. Hatch is president. If, through them, his employer did not 
make attendance at the Governor's Ball a part of his job duties, 
if they did not direct him to attend, and if his presence did 
not further the business interests of the newspaper in a tangible 
way, the activity was not part of the course of his employment 
under Utah law. An award of compensation benefits which is 
founded solely upon evidence that Mr. Cheney told several people 
he intended to discuss business during his evening with the 
Hatches is necessarily the result of a misapplication of Section 
45 of the Act. 
The Industrial Commission's misconstruction of the law is 
one which would have an onerous effect on workmen's compensation 
in this state if affirmed. This court has taken a strict view of 
the compensability of injuries which are suffered by ''blue collar 
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workers," that is, people who work for wages during specified 
hours at a specified place. If such a worker claims that he was 
injured after hours and outside his employer's premises, he must 
produce clear evidence under Utah law that he was engaging in a 
service to his employer at the time. This strict view is war-
ranted by the Act itself which is intended to compensate workers 
for injuries arising out of the hazards of their jobs, and not 
as a general accident insurance policy. 
If the Commission's decision becomes the law of this juris-
diction, a strikingly difficult standard of compensability would 
apply to managerial workers who can always assert that the broad 
nature of their responsibilities makes all kinds of activities 
outside the office a service to their employer. If a mere in-
tention to discuss business at a social activity is sufficient 
to make the trip to and from that event part of his employment, 
the average white collar worker could bring nearly every lunch 
time excursion or afternoon golf game within the course of his 
employment. No one could suggest that when a factory worker 
stops after work for a refreshment with co-workers, even if he 
was invited by his foreman, that an accident on his way home 
arose out of his employment. It would be grossly unfair to hold 
at the same time that ~Then a manager accepts an invitation from a 
supervisor to attend a prestigous social event, his own intention 
to discuss bnsiness with his supervisor, even when not effectuated, 
makes his attendance there an incident of his employment. 
The Industrial Commission's award of benefits in this case 
is based upon an erroneous construction of the Compensation Act 
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and sould be reversed. 
POINT III 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S AWARD 
IS BASED ON INCOMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The Commission majority summarized the evidence which it 
found sufficient to sustain the award made in this matter by 
stating that (1) the deceased attended the Governor's Ball with 
a business purpose in mind, and (2) the event was considered 
primarily as a "business linked event." Both of these findings 
rest, however, on incompetent evidence. 
(a) Hearsay Evidence. This Court has held that, for the 
limited purpose of assisting the Commission in interpreting and 
understanding competent, material evidence, it may receive other-
wise inadmissable hearsay testimony. Columbia Steel v. Industrial 
Commission, 92 Utah 72, 66 P.2d 124 (1937); Ogden Iron Works v. 
Industrial Commission, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 (1942). It 
has consistently been heid however, that 
since the action of the Commission re-
sults in a determination of the substantial 
rights of the parties, this Court has long 
been committed to the position that there 
must be a residuum of evidence, legal and 
competent in a court of law, to support a 
claim before an award can be made, and a 
finding cannot be based wholly on hearsay 
evidence. 
132 P.2d at 379. 
This Court quite recently reaffirmed its prior holding that 
in an administrative proceeding such as the Public Service Corn-
mission or the Industrial Commission, 
a finding of fact cannot be based solely 
on hearsay evidence, but must be supported 
by a residium of legal evidence competent 
-30-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in a court of law. 
Sandy Sta·te Bank v. W. S. Brimhall, 636 P.2d 481 (Utah 
1981). 
The Administrative Law Judge received extensive testimony 
from two reporters who worked under Mr. Cheney's supervision and 
from his brother-in-law and sister-in-law about his plans to 
spend the evening with Mr. and Mrs. Hatch. Specifically, Vaugn 
Roche testified that the afternoon of the Governor's Ball, Mr. 
Cheney told him he was attending "because management wanted him 
to." (R 187) John Harrington testified that Mr. Cheney told him 
on the same day that he would "have a chance to really do a sales 
job on the [Freeman Institute] story" at the ball. (R 137) Mrs. 
Pamela Skelton testified concerning conversations withMr. Cheney's 
wife about why it was important to Mr. Cheney's business position 
that they attend the ball rather than spend the evening with their 
family. (R 213-217) Mr. Steven Skelton testified that on the day 
before the ball, Mr. Cheney told him that he looked forward to it 
as an opportunity to talk with Mrs. Hatch about newspaper philo-
sophy and improve his understanding of her position on matters of 
policy. (R 228) This testimony was the subject of a continuing 
objection by counsel for the plaintiffs. (R 186-187, 213, 216) 
In order to determine whether this evidence is competent to 
support the Industrial Commission's findings, the question whether 
it is admissible under any exception to the hearsay rule must be 
considered. Inasmuch as it was introduced in order to establish 
the deceased's intention to discuss business at the Governor's 
Ball, Rule 63(12) of the Utah Rules of Evidence might be suggested 
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as a basis for receiving it. This exception to the hearsay 
rule provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Statements of Physical or Mental Condition 
of Declarant. Unless the judge finds it was 
made in bad faith, a statement of the declar-
ant' s (a) then existing state of mind, emotion 
or physical sensation, including statements of 
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, 
pain and bodily health, but not including 
memory or belief to prove the fact remembered 
or believed, when such a mental or physical 
condition is in issue or-is relevant to prove 
or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. . . 
(emphasis supplied) 
The distinctive feature of the "state of mind" exception to 
the hearsay rule is that it arises only when hearsay statements 
about the declarant's state of mind are relevant to explain his 
own acts or conduct. Such statements are, therefore, inadmissible 
to prove or explain the acts or conduct of someone other than the 
declarant, and are inadmissible when the state of mind of the de-
clarant in performing certain acts is not in issue. 
Construing the rule in the case of State v. Wauneka, 560 
P.2d 1377 (Utah 1977),this Court reversed the conviction of a 
defendant who was found guilty of manslaughter for the death of 
his wife. The trial court had received evidence of statements 
made by the deceased victim shortly before her death that the de-
fendant would kill her if she left him or called the police. 
Holding the admission of such testimony to be both erroneous and 
prejudicial the court stated that, 
The statement made by the deceased that 
Ben would kill her if she called the po-
lice or left him may well be proof of her 
then state of mind and of her mental feel-
ing; but her then mental condition is not 
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an issue in this trial, nor is it relevant 
to prove or explain her subsequent acts or 
conduct. 
560 P.2d at 1379. (A thorough exposition of the antecedents 
and current application of this exception to the hearsay rule 
in both civil and criminal context is found in an article at 
1977 Utah Law Review No. 1, p. 85 "Relative Relevance -- A 
Limitation on the Use of State of Mind Testimony in Homocide 
Prosecutions"} 
Reviewing the hearsay evidence upon which the Commission 
relied in making its findings, it is apparent first that the 
testimony of Vaugn Roche that Mr. Cheney told him he was attend-
ing the Governor's Ball "because management wanted him to" is 
inadmissible under this exception to prove anything about what 
Mrs. Hatch or other management personnel wanted or said or did. 
It is equally obvious that the lengthy testimony concerning Mrs. 
Cheney's statements of why she felt it was important that they 
accept Mrs. Hatch's invitation, or what her husband had said to 
her on the subject, are not admissible under this exception since 
her state of mind and her conduct are in no way relevant to the 
findings the Commission was required to make. 
The question presented then, is whether the remainder of 
the hearsay evidence of Mr. Cheney's statements about his plans 
to discuss employment related subjects during his evening with 
the Hatches is admissible under the state of mind exception to 
the hearsay rule. 
By the express terms of the rule, such evidence is admissible 
only if the plans of the deceased to discuss subjects which were 
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notactually discussed are relevant in themselves or relevant 
to explain his conduct during the evening. However, under Utah 
law, as it has been noted, the issues in a case such as this 
are (a) whether Mr. Cheney was expressly or impliedly required 
by his employer to attend the Governor's Ball, or whether his 
supervisors otherwise by their conduct made his attendance part 
of his duties and (b) whether the Ogden Standard Examiner de-
rived a substantial and tangible benefit to its business by 
Mr. Cheney's attendance at the ball. Mr. Cheney's statements 
about what he intended to do are simply not relevant, as the 
plaintiffs have contended here earlier, to either issue and 
therefore are not admissbile under the state of mind exception 
to the hearsay rule. 
According to the decisions of this court, the hearsay evi-
dence upon which the Commission relied cannot be the basis of 
the factual findings it made. 
(b) Opinion Evidence. The only other evidence upon which the 
Commission relied in making its award was the testimony of Mr. 
Briggs and Mrs. Wilde about why people attend the Governor's 
Ball. Though, as noted earlier, their opinions differed, and 
though they both acknowledged that some people's reasons for at-
tending differed from others, the Commission relied on this evi-
dence in finding that the ball was a "business-linked" event and 
that the deceased's presence there was business related. 
Evidence in the form of a witness's opinion is admissible 
under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Evidence in certain circum-
stances. 
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RULE 56 
TESTIMONY IN FORM OF OPINION 
(1) If the witness is not testifying as an 
expert his testimony in the form of opinions 
or inferences is limited to such opinions or 
inferences as the judge finds (a) may be ra-
tionally based on the perception of the wit-
ness and (b) are helpful to a clear under-
standing of his testimony or to the deter-
mination of the fact in issue. 
(2) If the witness is testifying as an ex-
pert, testimony of the witness in the form 
of opinions or inferences is limited to such 
opinions as the judge finds are (a) based on 
facts or data perceived by or personally 
known or made known to the witness at the 
hearing and (b) within the scope of the 
special knowledge, skill, experience or 
training possessed by the witness. 
The pertinent testimony from Mr. Briggs concerning his know-
ledge of the reasons people attend the Governor's Ball is as follows: 
Q. Are these kinds of people you've been de-
scribing the kinds that generally attend the ball? 
A. Yes, they would attend the ball. 
Q. Do you know why--I'm not asking specifically 
do you know why generally they attend the ball? 
(Objection and discussion omitted) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Low) All you can do is answer yes, 
because that was the question, yes or no. Now, what 
background or information do you have that would lead 
you to that opinion? 
A. Well, my experience as an executive director. 
Q. As an experienced executive director, do you 
have contact with the people you invite to the ball? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. Has that been over a period of several years? 
A. Two years. Particularly the two years, that 
was one of my chief responsibilities, yes. 
Q. Do you in that position have personal contact 
with these people? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Have you ever discussed with people who are 
invited to the ball why they attend? 
A. No. (emphasis supplied) 
* * * 
Q. (By Mr. Low) My question is this, Kent. On 
what do you base this opinion that you have that you 
know why people attend the ball? 
A. Experience. 
Q. I'd like you to tell us what experience. 
A. All right. The ball, first of all, is a fine 
social event. The Utah Sumphony played while I was there. 
The RDT did a little stint. It was something that was--
dancing, good food. There was also a-- the chance for 
people who worked, knew each other, to see each other and 
talk. I's a social event as well as a fund-raising ac-
tivity; but the primary responsibility of the ball was to 
raise money. I mean, you didn't do it just to bring 
people together. It was a way of funding the opera-
tions of the Democratic Party. 
(R 160-162) 
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Mrs. Wilde's testimony about her own expertise in assessing 
the motives of those who attend the Governor's Ball was comparable. 
She discussed her planning functions as an assistant to the 
Governor but testified as to no specific facts from which their 
state of mind could be inferred. 
Mr. Briggs and Mrs. Wilde's opinion testimony, whether they 
are considered lay witnesses or experts on the subject of the 
Governor's Ball,was improperly received. In either event, they 
are properly limited under the Rule to opinions which are based 
upon their own perceptions or facts known to them. They did not 
testify about having spoken to anyone concerning their reasons 
for attending the Governor's Ball, and testified as to no other 
facts from which they could made a reasonable inference about 
the state of mind of people generally who attended the Governor's 
Ball. 
Furthermore, no theory was advanced by the defendant and 
none is apparent, of the relevance of this testimony to the issues 
before the Commission. If the pertinent questions to be resolved 
concerned the nature 9f Mrs. Hatch's invitation to Mr. Cheney 
and the relation of their activity during the evening to their 
business, evidence about the motives of people generally in at-
tending the event is simply not probative. 
Opinion evidence is not admissible when the trier of fact is 
capable of drawing his own inferences and conclusions from the 
facts presented. Yowell v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 100 Utah 
120, 110 P.2d 566 (1941); Sturgis v. Garett, 85 Idaho 364, 379 
P.2d 658 (1963). A witness may not offer a conclusion which is 
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founded upon surmise and hearsay rather than testifying as to 
facts, and their reasonable inferences. Hansen v. Hansen, 
110 Utah 222, 171 P.2d 392 (1949). And, even when a witness is 
permitted to repeat a conversation he had had with another he may 
not express his opinion as to the state of mind of the declarant. 
Kimball Elevator Co. v. Elevator Supplies Co., 2 Utah2d 289, 272 
P.2d 583 (1954). 
An expert witness may give his opinion about a matter which 
involves some aspect of trade or learning not within the general 
knowledge of the trier of fact.Webb v. Olin Matheson Chemical 
Corp., 9 Utah2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094 (1959). Thus, it may have 
been permissible to allow Mr. Briggs and Mrs. Wilde to testify 
about the nature and purpose of the Governor's Ball if some basis 
qf its relevance were established. However, nothing in their 
credentials or experience qualified them as experts in assessing 
the state of mind of people generally who attend the event, and 
their opinions on the subject were inadmissible conclusions based 
on unfounded speculation. 
Thus, the two findings of fact which the Commission expressly 
relied on in making its award, that the deceased intended to dis-
cuss business at the ball, and that many people attend the ball 
for business reasons, are founded entirely upon incompetent evi-
dence which cannot support the conclusion that the deceased's 
death arose out of or in the course of his employment. 
CONCLUSION 
The accident which took Clifford Cheney's life was a terrible 
and tragic occurrence. However, the law does not impose upon the 
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employers' of this state the obligation to insure their employees 
or their dependents against any injury they suffer, but only to 
compensate them for accidents which arise out of or in the 
course of their employment. When an employee has an accident 
while discharging his duties or engaging in activities reasonably 
incidental to his duties,his accident is compensable. When a 
worker dies in an automobile accident while returning to his home 
from a public social event outside his employer's premises, his 
death is not compensable absent proof that he was specially re-
quired to attend it or was otherwise engaged in service to his 
employer at the time. This court has consistently reversed 
awards of the Commission where the findings or the evidence did 
not support such a conclusion. 
.... 
In the case at bar the Industrial Commission found that 
Clifford Cheney was invited by the president of the corporation 
which employed him to attend a public social event and to visit 
her home. It found that he intended to discuss business with her 
during the evening but did not. These findings do not support 
the legal conclusion that his death en route to his home at 
the end of the evening was reasonably related to his duties as 
managing editor of the Standard Examiner. Furthermore, there is 
no evidence upon which the Industrial Commission could base find-
ings which would support an award since the undisputed testimony 
was that the deceased was not required to attend the Governor's 
Ball and engaged in no service to his employer during the evening. 
To affirm the order of the Industrial Commission, this Court 
would have to adopt a construction of Section 45 of the Compensa-
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tion Act that renders all after hours social intercha~ge be-
tween people who work together a part of their employment for 
the purpose of workmen's compensation. Such a construction of 
the law is directly contrary to this Court's prior application of 
the Act and completely inconsistent with its purpose. The plain-
tiffs respectfully request that the Industrial Commission's 
order be reversed. 
DATED this J riv day of June, 1982. 
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